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 We will have to determine the extent of the 
individual participation of each defendant, based upon 
his individual action, in all of the activities related to 
the planning, preparation and waging of aggressive 
wars and, in that connection, consideration will be 
given to acts done in their personal, individual, or 
official capacity not performed in their capacity as 
officials or employees of the Farben enterprises. In 
addition it will be necessary to consider the extent of 
the participation of the alleged instrumentality Farben, 
in the such activities and then to asses the degree of 
individual responsibility, if any, for the actions of 
Farben, the instrumentality, and the subsidiaries of 
Farben. Some of the defendants acted personally and 
completely outside the frame-work of Farben, while 
others acted solely in their capacities as officials and 
employees. Basically this involves these questions - 
What is the responsibility of a member of the 
Vorstand of Farben who knew that a gigantic 
rearmament program was being carried out by the 
business enterprise of which he was a responsible 
director – who knew that such rearmament program 
was being directed by (a national policy) the State 
which was then actively engaged in an aggressive 
foreign policy of territorial aggandizement based 
primarily upon a threat of emplying force if necessary 
for the achievement of the objectives of that foreign 
policy. Upon to a certain 
 period of time, even (wi) if the defendants are to be 
charged with the common knowledge then prevailing in 
Germany, it cannot be said that upo to that point of time 
there was ever any common knowledge of the intention 
of Hitler and the Nazi party to wage a war of 
aggression. Certainly the Munich pact was widely 
heralded as the end of territorial demands of Hitler and 
created widespread hope as Chamberlain had 
optimistically expressed it that the policy of 
appeasement would result in the purchase of peace in 
our time. It cannot be denied that there was 
considerable fear in Germany that they policies of 
Hitler would lead to war. That he would become so 
saturated with the successes without necessity of 
launching a war that he would intensify his excessive 
demands and would overstep the limits of toleration of 
such policy which up to then had been suffered, albeit 
not without protest, by the community of nations, 
dedicated as they were to the high humanitarian 
purpose of averting the catastrophy of a second world 
war. The extent to which the civilized nations of the 
world were willing to go in this regard is well 
illustrated by the appeals made to Hitler by the 
President of the United States and the Vatican on the 
eve of the invasion of Poland and in a last minute effort 
to prevail upon Hitler to agree to 
 mediation of his demands, thereby avoiding the horrors 
which have now been written with blood in the pages of 
history. 
Can it be said that these defendants had knowledge 
of Hitler's plans to wage an aggressive war in the 
absence of direct and positive proof of such knowledge 
brought home to either through participation on one of 
the important secret conferences at which he announced 
his aggressive intentions or through other credible proof 
that report decisions was brought home to them in some 
other way by persons havving direct and intimate 
knowledge of such plans and intentions. It has been 
argued this this question may be answered in the 
affirmativ(e) and that a case for the requisite criminal 
knowledge to establish on of the essential elements of 
criminal guilt is to be found in a series of interences 
which may be legitimately drawn and applied to the 
activities of the defendants in this case. This amounts to 
poling inference upon inference and while such 
deductions from the chain of facts does constitute 
conclusions that are decidedly more in the realm of 
probability than in the realm of possibility; while the 
Tribunal is invlined to believe that the defendants, or 
some of them, may have known of the plans to agrresive 
war – yet notwithstanding this inclination on the part of 
the Tribunal, we cannot conclude from the evidence 
before us that the fact of knowledge is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt in accordance with the standard of 
porrof above mentioned. 
 It is true that the defendants occupied high positions in 
the industrial life of Germany and in that capacity they 
had much intimate knowledge which was withheld 
from the General public. They knew, for example, theat 
their plans were engaged day by day in production of 
many materials, chemical products which could be used 
only for the waging of war. They knew that furthermore 
than they were engaged in the production of synthetic 
raw materials without which Germany could not wage 
war on a scale which could not possibly been keeping 
with not alone the peace time needs of Germany. They 
knew or were charged with knowledge that facility 
expansion for the production of these materials was far 
in excess of any possible peace-time estimates of the 
needs of Germany. They knew that secret stand-by 
plants for war production were being erected by them 
under agreements with the Reich and various agencies 
of the Wermacht. But all that this amounts to is an 
intimate knowledge of the extent of the secret re-
armament of Germany unless we are prepared to say (as 
a matter of law) that rearmament with knowledge that 
such gigantic efforts are involved creates the necessary 
inference that they knew of the plans to wage 
aggressive wars, the case against the defendants must 
fall on the charge of planning and preparing a war of 
aggression. 
 While factual distinctions may be drawn between the 
activities of Schacht who was acquitted by the 
International Military Tribunal and the sustained 
activities of the Farben defendants – the pronouncement 
by the Tribunal that "rearmament does not constitute a 
crime under the Charter" cannot be overlooked or easily 
explained away. It is perhaps a deplorable state of 
affairs to be forced to recognize that gigantic 
rearmament activities carried out by a group of men 
who were willing to do business with Hitler and who, at 
every stage of the hideous Nazi program, raised no 
voice of protest, but went along willingly in that 
program does not constitute a crime against peace. But 
the answer to that problem is one which has often been 
given before applying principles of law which this 
tribunal is bound to uphold. There can be no 
pubishment for action unless the action denounced 
constitutes a crime. Here one of the essential elements 
of the crime of planning and preparing for a war of 
aggression is lacking, that is the guilty knowledge. The 
principles of international law reflected in the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal have indeed by 
legislative enactment any recognition of principles of 
common international law after the development of 
Anglo American common law – progressed to the point 
at which the planning or preparation of a war of 
aggression is a crime against international law for 
which there is 
 individual penal responsibility, but it cannot be now 
asserted that international law has developed to the point 
at which rearmament of itself was recognized as a crime 
against intentional law unless that rearmament 
is part and parcel of a plan to wage aggressive war known 
to the parties participating in the rearmament. It is 
fervently to be hoped that in the not two distant future the 
dangerous potentialities of action of the character of which 
these defendants were engaged will be recognized to the 
point of >developing some ?  arming the community of 
nations to deal with its problem of > rearmament in 
violation of international treates a crime of itself without 
the necessity > (of proving) Perhaps action of this 
character should be made punishable without exact > a 
knowledge of the intended use of armaments so produced. 
But here there is (an inescapable conflict with the 
possibility of lawing action) despite the difficulty of 
harmonizing any such rule of law with rearmament 
legitimately conceived for defensive purposes. (which are 
the legitimate in character.) 
We might draw an analogy. Suppose that Mr. 
Truman should be advised that war with the Soviet Union 
is inevitable and he and a high circle of advisers determine 
that they will pursue a policy based upon the threat of 
force even to the application to force to obtain certain 
demands from Russia. 
The intention to use force to the point of war is not 
publicly announced, but the demands of the Government 
of the United States are made public 
 an immediately there is widespread fear that the policy 
so announced means that the war with Russia is 
inevitable. There is immediate intensification of the 
rearmament plans of the United States. Measnres for 
economic mobilization for ware are initiated; projuction 
of armament is pushed with all the initiative and 
inhenuity which is characteristic of American free 
enterprise; Americans gird themselves and get ready for 
come what may. The last demand of the United States 
is rejected and the President and Congress of the United 
States declare war on Russia under circumstances 
which make it inescapable that the war is a war of 
aggression. Can it be said that the officials of the 
Dupont company are liable for participating in the 
planning and preparation of a war of aggression if the 
knew nothing more than the common knowledge above 
referred to? Can it be said that the Oak Ridge scientist 
who, with knowledge of the possibility that war was 
imminent, feverishly and with great initiative, rushes to 
completion the current modification of his atomic bom, 
even more terrible than the first, is guilty of initiating a 
war of aggression, or participating in the planning and 
prepratiaon for such a war? In judging facts in 
retrospect we mush soundly consider the application of 
such facts to other times and other circumstances which 
cannot be readily distinguishable on principle. 
 Unless rearmament with knowledge of the possibility 
that an aggressive war is imminent, constitutes a crime, 
the defendants can not be convicted for participation in 
the cmmon plan of aggression or initiating, planning, 
and preparing a war of aggression, in violation of 
treaties etc. 
 
It is no doubt considerations such as these which 
prompted the IMT to require, as a condition precedent 
to criminal complicity in the common plan that there be 
some detailed and intimate knowledge of specific plans 
to wage a was of aggression. The prosecution correctly 
states that it is not essential that the date and the hour be 
known - but the fact that a war of aggression is to be 
launched must be knwon to constitute the requisite 
guilty knowledge. 
